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STATEMENT of the CASE 
Late in 19991 did inform Mr. Anglin, a creditor of some of the parties of the Global 
Settlement Agreement, that he might be able to collect some of his debt by garnishing 
funds coming to me. Mr. Anglin is not a party of the Global Settlement, and had no 
contractual impediment to collecting this debt. Mr. Anglin is an acquiantance of a 
friend; 1 have had very limited dealings with him. However, with my help me he lent to 
some of the parties $10,000., funds that came from a settlement having to do with the 
death of one of his children. Attempting to collect this legal debt infuritated the parties 
that worked so hard to elude creditors, and especially Mr. Jensen (see addendum 1) 
because the money was to be paid to him (revealed at 11-15-99 garnishment hearing). 
Judge Bohling ruled that the receivorship would have to be reopened to proceed. Mr. 
Anglin simply ceased his collection efforts. Mr. Jensen sued him for attorney's fees, 
lost, appealed to the Supreme Court and lost without any repsonse form Mr. Anglin. 
Concurrently in December 1999, Mr. Jensen sued me for breach of contract. This is 
the third suit the parties have brought against me, and no wrongdoing on my part has 
been proven, nor occurred. 
As Ronald Dunn explained (R. 461, items 3,4) we were late filing counterclaims 
due to a life threatening medical emergency. The last thing I wanted to do was start 
another lawsuit. I was told we should start the countersuit and then have it 
consolidated, allowing the claims to be considered in one suit. Not allowing the claims 
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to be submitted under the circumstances was unfair. Trying to maintain a reasonable 
course under the circumstances has been difficult and not entirely successful. 
Meanwhile, the breach of contract suit was defeated when Judge Peuler ruled in 
my favor, granting judgment for attorney's fees. After almost 2 years of litigation, and 
numerous post judgment motions, Mr. Jensen accused Judge Peuler of bias. While 
denying bias, Judge Peuler recused herself. Rather than deciding the remaining 
motions, Judge Medley reversed Judge Peuler and we started all over. Judge 
Medley eventually made several rulings that made a final ruling in our favor most 
likely, and we were set for a hearing on 9-9-02, when Custom Steel filed for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy on 8-16-02. At any rate, none of the claims by Mr. Jensen of breach, 
conspiracy, etc. have been proved in court and are baseless. 
For the record, re: 3rd cause of action, Randy Isaacson's Affidavit (Exhibit C of 
"Applicant's Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Intervene as a Defendant and 
Strike Hearing, filed 7-9-96, Case No. 960902152CV) states that,"... the factor could 
look to CFM as a guarantor of each invoice, since CFM provided a warranty that each 
invoice was good for the face amount." (Pg. 2, #7) On pg. 3, #9 he says,"... Clean 
Gas is ready to pay $30,217", and the invoice is the same one that is contested in this 
action. This refutes counsel's arguments at R. 329, #4 and R. 414, III, which by the 
highlighting I believe the judge relied heavily upon. I did not find this evidence until 
shortly after the final judgment, but decided appealing was pointless. 
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STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. Mr. Jensen had assigned to himself (Addendum 2,1 was unable to find where it 
is in the Record) on 11-05-01, proceeds from this and other cases. This makes him 
the party in interest, at least from that date, as he has also been since his filing Case 
No. 990911896, the preceeding proceeding, having obtained a 'Release' that walks 
and talks like an assignment in August of 1999. 
2. Shortly after Mr. Jensen's obtaining the 11-05-01 Assignment, Custom Steel filed 
for Chapter 11, trial court being notified of automatic stay on 11-27-01 (R. 437). As 
successfully argued by Mr. Lyons, counsel I retained in Idaho, Custom Steel had an 
interest in this case, and Bankruptcy Judge Pappas' ordered parties to cease 
collection efforts on 3-13-02 (R. 527). The Chapter 11 was dismissed on 4-10-02. 
3. The Chapter 11 deposition, brought by Mr. Jensen in attempt to be appointed 
special counsel, shows that the only party that has an agreement with him is Custom 
Steel, and no one else has paid him or retained him. R. 508, #4 summarizes, refers to 
pp. 100-102 of deposition. 
4. Since approximately 11-10-01,1 had a judgment against Custom Steel in excess 
of $30,000, arising from Case No. 990911543, Judge Dever's court. 
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SUMMARY of ARGUMENT 
The only issue is the amount awarded for attorney fees. And the only issue on 
amounts awarded for attorney fees is clear abuse of discretion. Cafferty v. Hughes, 
2002 UT, App 105, which is primarily concerned with a number of aspects of attorney 
fees and incorporates Dixie State Bank v. Bracken and Valcarce v. Fitzgeraldis right 
on point. The majority of arguments presented before appeal, if not all, presented by 
both sides, have no weight, and the judge was proper in not granting us an 
evidentiary hearing. Generally, although there is a question about the judge's editing, 
there is no clear abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I refer to Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT, App 105, Case No. 20000866-CA (filed 
April 11,2002): ' [par] 26 "Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a 
clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 
1988) (citation omitted). "A trial court's discretion in determining the amount of a 
reasonable attorney fees arises from the fact that it is in a better position than an 
appellate court to gauge the quality and efficiency of the representation and the 
complexity of the litigation.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 380 (Utah 1996))',...'Dixie, 
764 P.2d at 990 (footnotes omitted). In this analysis, "what an attorney bills... is not 
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determinative." Id. "The appropriateness of the work actually performed and of the 
attorney's billing rate is evaluated before a reasonable fee is set." Id. Accordingly, 
"[t]he trial court is not bound by the fees requested in the claimant's affidavit " 
N.A.R., Inc. v. Marcek, 2000UTApp 300, 11, 13 P.3d 612. In addition, the 
evidence regarding a reasonable attorney fee does not have to be disputed in order 
for a trial court to award a lower amount. See Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, 578 P. 2d 
520, 524 (Utah 1978) ("Even though [the reasonableness of the attorney fee] 
evidence is undisputed, the trial judge was not necessarily compelled to accept such 
self-interested testimony whole cloth and make such an award; and in the absence of 
patent error or clear abuse of discretion, this court will not disturb his findings or 
judgment." (footnote omitted)). 
Clearly, Mr. Jensen's records are not determinative. Neither is the judge's 5-18-01 
approval of attorney fees (R. 208) an approval of Mr. Jensen's hourly rate. The only 
issue on this issue is did Judge Dever abuse his discretion. 
Although Judge Dever heavily edited Mr Jensen's document, (R. 484-486) the 
judge's own entry of the judgment amount speaks for itself. This is bouyed by Judge 
Dever's subsequent "Denial of First Order and Judgment to Augment Original 
Judgment" (R. 628), wherein he writes in his own hand "finding that fees are 
unreasonable". It is not uncommon for judges to cut fees, sometimes by more than 
50%, and this worked to Mr. Jensen's personal benefit in another case before Judge 
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Dever. The amount the judge meant is clear, in his own hand, inline with what Judge 
Dever has done, and what other judges have decided. Clear abuse is not present. 
Some of the factors the judge may have considered include: 
1. My 'intransigence' is an effort to keep from being held in contempt of Federal 
Bankruptcy Court automatic stay. Due to Mr Jensen's efforts in violation of the 
automatic stay I was forced to retain counsel in Idaho; Judge Pappas eventually 
ordering all parties to cease collection efforts (R. 527). See Ron Dunn's arguments on 
application of the automatic stay to the suit at R. 506-509. I'm sure Mr. Jensen 
claims Judge Pappas' order didn't apply to him or whichever parties he didn't want it to 
apply, but I certainly don't want to be standing beside him to explain to Judge Pappas. 
2. Mr. Jensen is the party in interest here, and since he is primarily looking after his 
own interest, is not generally entitiled to fees. This conduct is a violation of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, 1.8(j). 
3. Judge Dever, aware of the 2 other suits in 3rd District Court and the Chapter 11, 
doubtless realized Mr. Jensen was trying to get his fees in a way that the fees would 
not be preferential, while making creditor's judgments worthless. 
4. Re: Issue No.2: It is certainly clear what the judge meant in his order denying 
augmenting the original judgment (R. 628). Also the judge had to deal with the 
improper Bench Warrant for my arrest brought by Mr. Jensen, the judge quashing it on 
6-13-02 (R. 621). 
-6-
CONCLUSION 
I cannot find clear abuse of discretion, just an editing discrepancy that Mr. Jensen 
is desperately trying to exploit. The theme of Mr. Jensen's practice is extracting fees. 
This motive is apparent throughout this and the preceeding suit. He has not pursued 
his client's best interest (unless he admits he is his own client) nor has he acted as an 
officer of the court. He has used the courts to satisfy a personal vendetta. I have not 
always defended myself well. I have tried to stay with the issues, and even then most 
likely have traveled outside of what is allowed by this Court. If so, I apologize. 1 also 
have not responded to every erroneous statement Mr. Jensen has made. We request 
that the Court affirm Judge Dever's appealed decisions. We request that Mr. Jensen 
be sanctioned. 
Dated 
Steven C. Blevins 
Debra Kay Blevins 
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CERTIFICATION of SERVICE Case No. 20020177-CA 
1, Steven Blevins certify that on d^dJodkor, *2~Z-j ZQQ3 \ served two copies 
of the attached Appellee's Brief upon Michael A. Jensen, the counsel for the apellant 
in the is matter, by mailing them to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
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Michael A. Jensen 
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Salt Lake City, UT 84157-1708 
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AND hand delivered 8 copies to the Court of Appeals on t^rJJm^Ki 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 




STEVEN C. BLEVINS and DEBRA KAY 
BLEVINS, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOSEPH J. HUGGINS 
Case No. 990911896-CV 
Honorable Sandra N. Peuler 
District Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Joseph J. Huggins, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I was retained by Mark Anglin to collect, if possible, a debt owed him by 
Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., which I attempted by obtaining a prejudgment writ of 
garnishment, which I then had served upon Steven C. Blevins in Case No. 990911095-DC, 
Anglin v. Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. aka CFM, Inc. (the "Garnishment 
Proceeding"). 
3. Shortly prior to November 29, 1999, I attended a hearing in the Garnishment 
Proceeding, also attended by Michael A. Jensen, Esq., attorney for Custom Steel Fabrication, 
Inc., the intervenor opposing the garnishment. 
4. Shortly after the hearing, Mr. Jensen stated to me that he would make my client and 
Mr. Blevins pay for trying to garnish the $6,667, no matter how long it took and no matter 
how much it might cost. 
DATED April SO>, 2001. 
Joseph J. Huafgins, Esq. / V 




I certify that on April ^ " 7 , 2001, I caused to be deposited in the United States mails, 
postage prepaid, the above-described document and this certificate, addressed to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
PO Box 571708 




Assignment to Michael A. Jensen 
ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST 
WHEREAS Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc. ("Custom") has since 1996 retained 
Michael A. Jensen ("Attorney") as its legal counsel in various litigation matters; and 
WHEREAS Custom has not folly paid for legal services rendered by Attorney; and 
WHEREAS Custom has certain funds owed to it by Steven C. and Debra Kay 
Blevins (the "Blevins"); and 
WHEREAS such funds are comprised of (1) $10,000 on deposit with the Third 
District Court, Case No. 990911896; (2) $7,000 owed as restitution from the Blevins 
based on Custom's payment of that amount on judgment in Caj>e No. 990911896 that is 
now vacated ("Vacated Judgment"); and (3) $1,330 from a judgment against the Blevins 
in Case No. 000906072 and which amount was unilaterally offset by the Blevins from the 
Vacated Judgment and which amount is now owed to Custom (collectively "Funds"). 
WHEREAS Custom expects the Third District Court, Case No. 990911896 and 
also Case No. 000906072, to enter oue or more orders requiring the Blevins to pay the 
Funds in part or all to Custom or to its Attorney Client Trust Account. 
THEREFORE, to ensure that the Funds are used exclusively to pay part of 
Custom's debt with Attorney, Custom agrees to assign, and hereby does assign to 
Attorney all its interest in the Funds as described and set forth above. Custom further 
agrees that this assignment is effective immediately and irrevocable and without recourse. 
Custom also acknowledges that this assignment does not by itself discharge or satisfy 
Custom's debt with Attorney, but that such debt will be reduced only to the extent the 
Funds, or part of such Funds, are received by Attorney. 
DATED this 5th day of November 2001. 
Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc 
By: Heidi Bishop, Ownerand Director 
On the 5^ day of November 2001, personally appeared before me, both of the 
above individuals, Wendy Garamendi and Heidi Bishop, the signers of the within 
Assignment, who acknowledged to me that theydid execute the same and that the contents 
thereof were true, accurate and complete to the best of their information and belief. 
^ i f > * ^ ^* ^ ^ A / i J V A r\ RULA J. THOMAS 
STATE OF IDAHO 
NOTARY — PUBLIC 
Pvhlhif l< 
fARY PUBLIC 
